李勒, 洪爽俊, 张驰. 基于部分配置信息的错误数据注入攻击[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2014, 31(2): 85-89,93.
引用本文: 李勒, 洪爽俊, 张驰. 基于部分配置信息的错误数据注入攻击[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2014, 31(2): 85-89,93.
LI Le, HONG Shuang-jun, ZHANG Chi. False Data Injection Attack Based on Partial Configuration Information[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2014, 31(2): 85-89,93.
Citation: LI Le, HONG Shuang-jun, ZHANG Chi. False Data Injection Attack Based on Partial Configuration Information[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2014, 31(2): 85-89,93.

基于部分配置信息的错误数据注入攻击

False Data Injection Attack Based on Partial Configuration Information

  • 摘要: 分析了电力系统配置矩阵,并提出了基于部分配置信息的的错误数据注入攻击,使得攻击者的第一个攻击需求也是最强的一个攻击需求得到了大幅度的减弱.最后通过对IEEE测试系统进行仿真分析,验证了方案的有效性和可行性.

     

    Abstract: False data injection attack (FDIA),systematically tampering with measurements of power system,could bypass the classical bad data detection algorithm and then result in wrong output of power system state estimation,which poses a great threat to power system.However,FDIA also gives great challenges to attackers.To launch FDIA,attackers have to access the current power system configuration information firstly and manipulate the measurements of meters secondly.To lower the first attack condition,we analysis the configuration matrix of power system and propose FDIA based on partial configuration information,which greatly alleviates burdens on attackers.At last,we demonstrate the success of this attack through simulation of IEEE test systems.

     

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