胡文静, 王安, 乌力吉, 谢鑫君. 基于SAKURA-G实验板的SM4硬件电路能量攻击研究[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2015, 32(4): 15-20.
引用本文: 胡文静, 王安, 乌力吉, 谢鑫君. 基于SAKURA-G实验板的SM4硬件电路能量攻击研究[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2015, 32(4): 15-20.
HU Wen-jing, WANG An, WU Li-ji, XIE Xin-jun. Power Attack of SM4 Hardware Implementation Based on SAKURA-G Board[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2015, 32(4): 15-20.
Citation: HU Wen-jing, WANG An, WU Li-ji, XIE Xin-jun. Power Attack of SM4 Hardware Implementation Based on SAKURA-G Board[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2015, 32(4): 15-20.

基于SAKURA-G实验板的SM4硬件电路能量攻击研究

Power Attack of SM4 Hardware Implementation Based on SAKURA-G Board

  • 摘要: 目前,公开研究SM4能量攻击的实验中,功耗波形都采用计算机仿真、单片机软件实现等手段,这与实际中使用的SM4硬件电路实现的功耗尚有很大差别.由此分析了一种SM4算法硬件电路实现的安全性,将它的Verilog硬件电路下载到SAKURA-G开发板中,并采集其实际运行时的功耗信息.通过相关性能量分析技术对首轮S盒输入、首轮S盒输出、首轮输出寄存器多个可能泄露信息的位置进行攻击,还原了首轮子密钥.通过相同方法可以还原第2~4轮子密钥,最终推导128比特源密钥.最后分别从系统级和算法级探讨了相应的防御对策.

     

    Abstract: Currently, in public researches about SM4 power attack, the power traces are generated by computer simulation or software implementation. However, this is different with hardware implementation which is used in actual. A research of a SM4 algorithm hardware implementation is given out, which is applied in market. we download the Verilog code to a SAKURA-G board, and collect the power traces when it actually operates. Correlation Power Analysis method is used to analyze the leakage of the input of the S-box in the first round, the output of the S-box in the first round and the output registers of the first round. We recovered the sub-key of the first round. By the same method, we can recover the sub-keys of round 2-4, and eventually get the 128-bit key.

     

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