闫守礼, 郭丽敏, 王立辉, 李清, 俞军. 针对有掩码防护DES的代数侧信道攻击[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2019, 36(10): 10-14.
引用本文: 闫守礼, 郭丽敏, 王立辉, 李清, 俞军. 针对有掩码防护DES的代数侧信道攻击[J]. 微电子学与计算机, 2019, 36(10): 10-14.
YAN Shou-li, GUO Li-min, WANG Li-hui, LI Qing, YU Jun. Algebraic side channel attack against DES with mask countermeasure[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2019, 36(10): 10-14.
Citation: YAN Shou-li, GUO Li-min, WANG Li-hui, LI Qing, YU Jun. Algebraic side channel attack against DES with mask countermeasure[J]. Microelectronics & Computer, 2019, 36(10): 10-14.

针对有掩码防护DES的代数侧信道攻击

Algebraic side channel attack against DES with mask countermeasure

  • 摘要: 基于汉明重量泄漏模型, 对带掩码防护的软件DES抗代数侧信道攻击能力进行了评估.首先研究了代数侧信道攻击的攻击原理, 然后基于模板攻击得到了DES中间无防护轮次S盒输出的汉明重信息, 将其作为可配置参数, 利用脚本语言及BAT工具自动生成DES的合取范式表示, 最后利用求解器进行密钥求解.结果表明:对仅掩码防护首两轮及尾两轮的软件DES, 利用中间连续3轮S盒输出汉明重泄漏即可恢复56比特DES根密钥.

     

    Abstract: On the basis of the Hamming Weight leakage model, the anti algebraic side channel attack capability of a masked software DES is evaluated. The algebraic side channel attack principle is studied, and then the Hamming weight information of Sbox output of DES without protection is got based on the template attack, it is as the configurable parameters to generate conjunctive normal form of DES using script language and BAT tools, the key is retrieved by solver finally. The results show that the 56 bit DES root key can be recovered by using the Hamming weight of Sbox output from the middle 3 successive rounds, while the mask is only used to protect the first two rounds and the last two rounds of DES.

     

/

返回文章
返回